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    Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm
 
 Abstract
 
    This document specifies a padding convention for use with the AES Key
    Wrap algorithm specified in RFC 3394.  This convention eliminates the
    requirement that the length of the key to be wrapped be a multiple of
    64 bits, allowing a key of any practical length to be wrapped.
 
 Status of This Memo
 
    This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
    not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
    memo is unlimited.
 
 Copyright and License Notice
 
    Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
    to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
    include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
    the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
    described in the BSD License.
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 1.  Introduction
 
    Management of cryptographic keys often leads to situations where one
    symmetric key is used to encrypt and integrity-protect another key,
    which can be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric key.  The
    operation is often called key wrapping.
 
    This document specifies an extension of the Advanced Encryption
    Standard (AES) Key Wrap algorithm [AES-KW1, AES-KW2].  Without this
    extension, the input to the AES Key Wrap algorithm, called the key
    data, must be a sequence of two or more 64-bit blocks.
 
    The AES Key Wrap with Padding algorithm can be used to wrap a key of
    any practical size with an AES key.  The AES key-encryption key (KEK)
    must be 128, 192, or 256 bits.  The input key data may be as short as
    one octet, which will result in an output of two 64-bit blocks (or 16
    octets).  Although the AES Key Wrap algorithm does not place a
    maximum bound on the size of the key data that can be wrapped, this
    extension does so.  The use of a 32-bit fixed field to carry the
    octet length of the key data bounds the size of the input at 2^32
    octets.  Most systems will have other factors that limit the
    practical size of key data to much less than 2^32 octets.
 
    A message length indicator (MLI) is defined as part of an
    "Alternative Initial Value" in keeping with the statement in Section
    2.2.3.2 of [AES-KW1], which says:
 
       Also, if the key data is not just an AES key, it may not always be
       a multiple of 64 bits.  Alternative definitions of the initial
       value can be used to address such problems.
 
 2.  Notation and Definitions
 
    The following notation is used in the algorithm descriptions:
 
       MSB(j, W)   Return the most significant j bits of W
       LSB(j, W)   Return the least significant j bits of W
       ENC(K, B)   AES Encrypt the 128-bit block B using key K
       DEC(K, B)   AES Decrypt the 128-bit block B using key K
       V1 | V2     Concatenate V1 and V2
       K           The key-encryption key
       m           The number of octets in the key data
       n           The number of 64-bit blocks in the padded key data
       Q[i]        The ith plaintext octet in the key data
       P[i]        The ith 64-bit plaintext block in the padded key data
       C[i]        The ith 64-bit ciphertext data block
       A           The 64-bit integrity check register
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 3.  Alternative Initial Value
 
    The Alternative Initial Value (AIV) required by this specification is
    a 32-bit constant concatenated to a 32-bit MLI.  The constant is (in
    hexadecimal) A65959A6 and occupies the high-order half of the AIV.
    Note that this differs from the high order 32 bits of the default IV
    in Section 2.2.3.1 of [AES-KW1], so there is no ambiguity between the
    two.  The 32-bit MLI, which occupies the low-order half of the AIV,
    is an unsigned binary integer equal to the octet length of the
    plaintext key data, in network order -- that is, with the most
    significant octet first.  When the MLI is not a multiple of 8, the
    key data is padded on the right with the least number of octets
    sufficient to make the resulting octet length a multiple of 8.  The
    value of each padding octet shall be 0 (eight binary zeros).
 
    Notice that for a given number of 64-bit plaintext blocks, there are
    only eight values of MLI that can have that outcome.  For example,
    the only MLI values that are valid with four 64-bit plaintext blocks
    are 32 (with no padding octets), 31 (with one padding octet), 30, 29,
    28, 27, 26, and 25 (with seven padding octets).  When the unwrapping
    process specified below yields n 64-bit blocks of output data and an
    AIV, the eight valid values for the MLI are 8*n, (8*n)-1, ..., and
    (8*n)-7.  Therefore, integrity checking of the AIV, which is
    contained in a 64-bit register called A, requires the following
    steps:
 
    1) Check that MSB(32,A) = A65959A6.
 
    2) Check that 8*(n-1) < LSB(32,A) <= 8*n.  If so, let
       MLI = LSB(32,A).
 
    3) Let b = (8*n)-MLI, and then check that the rightmost b octets of
       the output data are zero.
 
    If all three checks pass, then the AIV is valid.  If any of the
    checks fail, then the AIV is invalid and the unwrapping operation
    must return an error.
 
 4.  Specification of the AES Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm
 
    The AES Key Wrap with Padding algorithm consists of a wrapping
    process and an unwrapping process, both based on the AES codebook
    [AES].  It provides an extension to the AES Key Wrap algorithm
    [AES-KW1, AES-KW2] that eliminates the requirement that the length of
    the key to be wrapped be a multiple of 64 bits.  The next two
    sections specify the wrapping and unwrapping processes, called the
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    extended key wrapping process and the extended key unwrapping
    process, respectively.  These names distinguish these processes from
    the ones specified in [AES-KW1] and [AES-KW2].
 
 4.1.  Extended Key Wrapping Process
 
    The inputs to the extended key wrapping process are the KEK and the
    plaintext to be wrapped.  The plaintext consists of between one and
    2^32 octets, containing the key data being wrapped.  The key wrapping
    process is described below.
 
    Inputs:  Plaintext, m octets {Q[1], Q[2], ..., Q[m]}, and
             Key, K (the KEK).
    Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}.
 
    1) Append padding
 
       If m is not a multiple of 8, pad the plaintext octet string on the
       right with octets {Q[m+1], ..., Q[r]} of zeros, where r is the
       smallest multiple of 8 that is greater than m.  If m is a multiple
       of 8, then there is no padding, and r = m.
 
       Set n = r/8, which is the same as CEILING(m/8).
 
       For i = 1, ..., n
          j = 8*(i-1)
          P[i] = Q[j+1] | Q[j+2] | ... | Q[j+8].
 
    2) Wrapping
 
       If the padded plaintext contains exactly eight octets, then
       prepend the AIV as defined in Section 3 above to P[1] and encrypt
       the resulting 128-bit block using AES in ECB mode [Modes] with key
       K (the KEK).  In this case, the output is two 64-bit blocks C[0]
       and C[1]:
 
          C[0] | C[1] = ENC(K, A | P[1]).
 
       Otherwise, apply the wrapping process specified in Section 2.2.1
       of [AES-KW2] to the padded plaintext {P[1], ..., P[n]} with K (the
       KEK) and the AIV as defined in Section 3 above as the initial
       value.  The result is n+1 64-bit blocks {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}.
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 4.2.  Extended Key Unwrapping Process
 
    The inputs to the extended key unwrapping process are the KEK and
    (n+1) 64-bit ciphertext blocks consisting of a previously wrapped
    key.  If the ciphertext is a validly wrapped key, then the unwrapping
    process returns n 64-bit blocks of padded plaintext, which are then
    mapped in this extension to m octets of decrypted key data, as
    indicated by the MLI embedded in the AIV.
 
    Inputs:  Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit blocks {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}, and
             Key, K (the KEK).
    Outputs: Plaintext, m octets {Q[1], Q[2], ..., Q[m]}, or an error.
 
    1) Key unwrapping
 
       When n is one (n=1), the ciphertext contains exactly two 64-bit
       blocks (C[0] and C[1]), and they are decrypted as a single AES
       block using AES in ECB mode [Modes] with K (the KEK) to recover
       the AIV and the padded plaintext key:
 
          A | P[1] = DEC(K, C[0] | C[1]).
 
       Otherwise, apply Steps 1 and 2 of the unwrapping process specified
       in Section 2.2.2 of [AES-KW2] to the n+1 64-bit ciphertext blocks,
       {C[0], C[1], ..., C[n]}, and to the KEK, K.  Define the padded
       plaintext blocks, {P[1], ..., P[n]}, as specified in Step 3 of
       that process, with A[0] as the A value.  Note that checking "If
       A[0] is an appropriate value" is slightly delayed to Step 2 below
       since the padded plaintext is needed to perform this verification
       when the AIV is used.
 
    2) AIV verification
 
       Perform the three checks described in Section 3 above on the
       padded plaintext and the A value.  If any of the checks fail, then
       return an error.
 
    3) Remove padding
 
       Let m = the MLI value extracted from A.
 
       Let P = P[1] | P[2] | ... | P[n].
 
       For i = 1, ... , m
        Q[i] = LSB(8, MSB(8*i, P))
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 5.  Algorithm Identifiers
 
    Some security protocols employ ASN.1 [X.680] and employ algorithm
    identifiers to name cryptographic algorithms.  To support these
    protocols, the AES Key Wrap with Padding algorithm has been assigned
    the following algorithm identifiers, one for each AES KEK size.  The
    AES Key Wrap (without padding) algorithm identifiers are also
    included here for convenience.
 
       aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
                 us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
                 nistAlgorithm(4) 1 }
 
       id-aes128-wrap     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 5 }
       id-aes128-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 8 }
 
       id-aes192-wrap     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 25 }
       id-aes192-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 28 }
 
       id-aes256-wrap     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 45 }
       id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 48 }
 
    In all cases, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter field MUST be absent.
 
 6.  Padded Key Wrap Examples
 
    The examples in this section were generated using the index-based
    implementation of the AES Key Wrap algorithm along with the padding
    approach specified in Section 4 of this document.  All values are
    shown in hexadecimal.
 
    The first example wraps 20 octets of key data with a 192-bit KEK.
 
       KEK   :  5840df6e29b02af1 ab493b705bf16ea1 ae8338f4dcc176a8
 
       Key   :  c37b7e6492584340 bed1220780894115 5068f738
 
       Wrap  :  138bdeaa9b8fa7fc 61f97742e72248ee 5ae6ae5360d1ae6a
             :  5f54f373fa543b6a
 
    The second example wraps 7 octets of key data with a 192-bit KEK.
 
       KEK   :  5840df6e29b02af1 ab493b705bf16ea1 ae8338f4dcc176a8
 
       Key   :  466f7250617369
 
       Wrap  :  afbeb0f07dfbf541 9200f2ccb50bb24f
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 7.  Security Considerations
 
    Implementations must protect the key-encryption key (KEK).
    Compromise of the KEK may result in the disclosure of all keys that
    have been wrapped with the KEK, which may lead to the compromise of
    all traffic protected with those wrapped keys.
 
    The KEK must be at least as good as the keying material it is
    protecting.
 
    If the KEK and wrapped key are associated with different
    cryptographic algorithms, the effective security provided to data
    protected with the wrapped key is determined by the weaker of the two
    algorithms.  If, for example, data is encrypted with 128-bit AES and
    that AES key is wrapped with a 256-bit AES key, then at most 128 bits
    of protection is provided to the data.  If, for another example, a
    128-bit AES key is used to wrap a 4096-bit RSA private key, then at
    most 128 bits of protection is provided to any data that depends on
    that private key.  Thus, implementers must ensure that key-encryption
    algorithms are at least as strong as other cryptographic algorithms
    employed in an overall system.
 
    The AES Key Wrap and the AES Key Wrap with Padding algorithms use
    different constants in the initial value.  The use of different
    values ensures that the recipient of padded key data cannot
    successfully unwrap it as unpadded key data, or vice versa.  This
    remains true when the key data is wrapped using the AES Key Wrap with
    Padding algorithm but no padding is needed.
 
    The AES Key Wrap with Padding algorithm provides almost the same
    amount of integrity protection as the AES Key Wrap algorithm.
 
    A previous padding technique was specified for wrapping Hashed
    Message Authentication Code (HMAC) keys with AES [OLD-KW].  The
    technique in this document is more general; the technique in this
    document is not limited to wrapping HMAC keys.
 
    In the design of some high assurance cryptographic modules, it is
    desirable to segregate cryptographic keying material from other data.
    The use of a specific cryptographic mechanism solely for the
    protection of cryptographic keying material can assist in this goal.
    The AES Key Wrap and the AES Key Wrap with Padding are such
    mechanisms.  System designers should not use these algorithms to
    encrypt anything other than cryptographic keying material.
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 Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules
 
    This appendix includes two ASN.1 modules.  The first one makes use of
    the 1988 syntax, and the second one makes use of the 2002 ASN.1
    syntax.
 
    Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
    algorithm identifiers included in this specification using ASN.1 as
    defined in [X.680] using the 1988 ASN.1 syntax.
 
    Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the algorithm
    identifiers included in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
    [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] using the 2002 ASN.1 syntax.
    This appendix contains the same information as Appendix A.1; however,
    Appendix A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.  The content
    encryption and key wrap algorithm objects are defined in [CMS-ASN].
 
    The id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap algorithm
    identifiers are defined in [AES-CMS].
 
 A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module
 
    AESKeyWrapWithPad-88 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
      pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) 47 }
 
    DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
 
    BEGIN
 
    -- EXPORTS ALL --
 
    -- IMPORTS NONE --
 
    -- AES information object identifiers --
 
    aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
      joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
      csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) 1 }
 
    -- AES Key Wrap With Padding Algorithm Identifiers are to be used
    -- with the Parameter field absent
 
    id-aes128-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 8 }
    id-aes192-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 28 }
    id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 48 }
 
    END
 
 
 
 
 Housley & Dworkin            Informational                     [Page 10] 
 RFC 5649          AES Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm        August 2009
 
 
 A.2.  2002 ASN.1 Module
 
    AESKeyWrapWithPad-02 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
      pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) 48 }
 
    DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
 
    BEGIN
 
    -- EXPORTS ALL --
 
    IMPORTS
      AlgorithmIdentifier{}, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-WRAP, SMIME-CAPS
      FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009  -- [CMS-ASN]
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
          id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) };
 
    AES-ContentEncryption CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
      cea-aes128-wrap-pad |
      cea-aes192-wrap-pad |
      cea-aes256-wrap-pad,
      ... }
 
    AES-KeyWrap KEY-WRAP ::= {
      kwa-aes128-wrap-pad |
      kwa-aes192-wrap-pad |
      kwa-aes256-wrap-pad,
      ... }
 
    SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
      cea-aes128-wrap-pad.&smimeCaps |
      cea-aes192-wrap-pad.&smimeCaps |
      cea-aes256-wrap-pad.&smimeCaps |
      kwa-aes128-wrap-pad.&smimeCaps |
      kwa-aes192-wrap-pad.&smimeCaps |
      kwa-aes256-wrap-pad.&smimeCaps,
      ... }
 
    -- AES object identifier
 
    aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
      joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
      gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) 1 }
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    -- Content Encryption Algorithms
 
    cea-aes128-wrap-pad CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-aes128-wrap-pad
      PARAMS ARE absent
      SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-aes128-wrap-pad } }
 
    cea-aes192-wrap-pad CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-aes192-wrap-pad
      PARAMS ARE absent
      SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-aes192-wrap-pad } }
 
    cea-aes256-wrap-pad CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-aes256-wrap-pad
      PARAMS ARE absent
      SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-aes256-wrap-pad } }
 
    -- Key Wrap Algorithms
 
    kwa-aes128-wrap-pad KEY-WRAP ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-aes128-wrap-pad
      PARAMS ARE absent
      SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-aes128-wrap-pad } }
 
    id-aes128-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 8 }
 
    kwa-aes192-wrap-pad KEY-WRAP ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-aes192-wrap-pad
      PARAMS ARE absent
      SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-aes192-wrap-pad } }
 
    id-aes192-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 28 }
 
    kwa-aes256-wrap-pad KEY-WRAP ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-aes256-wrap-pad
      PARAMS ARE absent
      SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-aes256-wrap-pad } }
 
    id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 48 }
 
    END
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